We report the results from a questionnaire-type experiment designed to elicit whether individuals decide in accordance with the equity axiom constituent for Rawls's second principle. The experiment is sequential in nature. Hence it generates data with panel data properties. We use recently developed panel data methods for studying the role that state dependence and unobservable individual-specific effects play for the observed equity judgements. The results indicate that a dominant share of our probants initially adhere to Hammond's equity axiom, but that many of these leave the Rawlsian position at later stages of the experiment. Although state dependence plays a significant role it cannot alone explain the observed decision behavior. In some situations individual-specific effects are operating.
Introduction
The Rawlsian school claims that welfare judgements should be based on how policies affect the utility of the worst-off individual in society. More specifically, welfare judgements should be guided by the Rawlsian difference principle, which underlies the maximin principle of Rawls (1971) . Rather than contemplating over this normative statement, we turn in the present paper to the positive issue whether individual decisions are consistent with a specific version of the difference principle. Since economic theory cannot provide an answer to this question, our examination will be empirical.
Empirical examinations are inflicted with their own problems. In particular, actual choices usually will be determined by a mixture of ethical and selfish considerations, the constraints under which choices are made, and strategic considerations. Thus it may be difficult to recover the underlying ethical principles from observed choices. A number of economists have therefore turned to experiments as a method for eliciting the principles that guide individuals when prioritizing on behalf of society.
We use an experimental setup developed by Gaertner (1992) . Probants are sequentially exposed to different levels of a treatments variable. Hence, the data generated share important properties with panel data. We apply panel data methods recently described by Honoré & Kyriazidou (2000) and Magnac (2000) , who in turn build on the work of Chamberlain (1985) , and Heckman (1981) . These methods are well suited for studying whether observed choices at the later stages of our experiment are affected by the choices made at earlier stages. An important feature of the estimation technique proposed by Chamberlain (1985) is that they allow for a separation of the impact of state dependence and individual-specific effects. To our knowledge, panel data methods have not previously been applied in the context of sequential experiments, but we see a large potential in such an extension in the use of these methods.
The present paper is related to the small empirical literature that uses experiments in the examination of equity judgements. Yaari & Bar-Hillel (1984) carried out one of the first experiments aimed at revealing the principles that guide individuals who are given the hypothetical task of allocating goods to others. After having examined nine different principles, including the Rawlsian maximin principle and Utilitarianism, they concluded that people in experiments tended to act in accordance with the Rawlsian maximin rule when taking decisions in situations involving "need". In other situations, however, they found that the maximin rule did not apply. Frohlich, Oppenheimer & Eavey (1987b) and Frohlich, Oppenheimer & Eavey (1987a) found that the vast majority of participants preferred a compromise between the Rawlsian maximin principle and Utilitarianism, rather than one of these "extreme" principles. In a third experiment, reported by Gaertner (1994) , the results are again mixed and difficult to understand as the outcome of one of the pure principles set out in the literature.
The work presented in the present paper is directly related to the seminal paper of Gaertner (1992) . Gaertner, Jungeilges & Neck (2001) summarize the state of the art by concluding that whether people base their welfare assessments on the Rawlsian difference principle is both context-dependent and dependent on the political and cultural environment. Similar conclusions were arrived at by Gaertner & Jungeilges (2002) , and Jungeilges & Theisen (2005) , and are emphasized also in the review paper of Konow (2003) .
Previous empirical research on equity judgements has to a very small extent drawn upon state-of-the-art statistical analysis. As argued by Manski (2002) , the reward for applying modern econometric methods may, however, be substantial. Jungeilges & Theisen (2005) take an important step in this direction, but do not consider explicitly the dynamics involved in sequential experimental designs. With the present paper we try to fill this shortcoming of the previous literature by using a Norwegian data set for addressing explicitly the dynamic aspects of sequential experiments, including an examination of state dependence. This distinguishes the present paper from that of Jungeilges & Theisen (2005) .
In Section 2, we provide a brief theoretical account of the social choice context motivating the experiment. A discussion of the experimental design, and the instrument used in the empirical examination is given in Section 3. The data collection procedure and the main features of probants are highlighted in Section 4. The subsequent section contains results on individuals' propensity to act in accordance with Rawls' second principle, and an analysis where decision trees are used for describing the sequential nature of our experiment. Moreover, we test the hypothesis that the results depend on the context of choice. In Section 6, we specify the econometric model used for examining and testing for the presence of state dependence. The maximum likelihood estimator for the state dependence parameter of a binary choice model in which the dependent variable is lagged once is determined explicitly. Next, in Section 7, we present estimation results and examine the presence of state dependence in our data. In addition, we assess how well state dependence alone can replicate our observations, and we discuss the extent to which our results are driven by individual-specific effects. A binary response model is, in Section 8, used to explore factors that drive individuals to act in accordance with the Rawlsian equity principle in the baseline question. Section 9 summarizes the main results and outlines some ideas for further research.
Theoretical Background
Let X = {x, y, . . .} represent a finite or infinite set of social states. The set N = {1, 2, . . . , i, j, . . . , n} refers to a finite group of individuals. Suppose that X ≥ 3 and N ≥ 3. Next, define R as the set of orderings on the set of social states X. Then for R ∈ R ∀ x, y ∈ X, we write xRy to indicate that a social state (or policy) x is at least as good as the state y from a collective point of view.
To reflect the evaluations of social states by individuals, consider the Cartesian product of the set of individuals and the set of social states: X × N . Elements of this set are of the form (x, i) . Such pairs are interpreted as referring to person i under social state x. Let U denote the set of bounded functions defined on X × N . Functions from this set are used for welfare comparisons between individuals under a given social state as well as between different individuals across alternative social states. Given u ∈ U ∀ i, j ∈ N and ∀ x, y ∈ X, the statement u (x, i) ≥ u(y, i) says that social state x is at least as good as social state y from the point of view of individual i. To express that under social state x individual i is at least as well off as as individual j under social state y, we write u (x, i) ≥ u(y, j) . Social choice theory is concerned with finding characterizations of social welfare functionals. That is, one tries to characterize the type of functions which can be defined from the set U to the set of orderings R, given some reasonable restrictions. Among the typical requirements such as independence of irrelevant alternatives, Paretotype principles and the anonymity principle one finds Hammond's equity axiom Axiom 1 For some u ∈ U and any x, y ∈ X, if for some pair of individuals i, j ∈ N u(y, i) < u(x, i) < u(x, j) < u(y, j) and for all k ∈ N \ {i, j} : u(y, k) = u (x, k) , then x R y.
This axiom says that the individual who is better off anyway should not determine the social ordering. The relationship to Rawls's second principle is apparent. At this point it is sufficient to state that this equity axiom is an important one. Deschamps & Gevers (1978) and Gaertner (1992) discuss the technical significance as well as extentions of this static axiom. The assumption of a stable utility function made in this line of research is acceptable also when sequential choices are made within a short span of time, and in a controlled experimental setting. We now turn to the experimental design used to examine whether human decisions are consistent with Axiom 1.
Experimental Design
To study whether peoples' attitudes are consistent with the equity axiom, six different situations or decision contexts were used. The design is due to Gaertner (1992) . It has been used in experiments at several universities in various countries. The format of all situations is of the same type as the general format described in Section 2. In addition to a copy of the material administered to probants, provided in the Appendix, main characteristics of the situations are given in Table 1 .
In each situation, there is always one group (person) who is always better off under x than under y, while the other group (person) is better off under y than under x. Let us use Situation 1 to explain the format. In the baseline question of Situation 1 probants are asked to decide whether a certain amount of money should be allocated exclusively to the assistance of a handicapped person (alternative x), or to the education of an intelligent child (alternative y). In the second step, alternative x still is to allocate the money to the assistance of the handicapped person, but the number of intelligent children that could get education in alternative y is increased to two. In the third and the fourth (and last) steps, the number of intelligent children who would benefit from alternative y is increased to three and four, respectively. In other words, more and more individuals who unanimously would prefer alternative y to x are gradually introduced, while the number of individuals who would benefit from x is kept constant at one. The crucial question is whether the number of individuals who would benefit from alternative y will affect the allocation of money, when money either must be allocated exclusively to x or exclusively to y.
In Situations 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, the alternatives among which probants are asked to prioritize differ from Situation 1. In Situation 2, probants are asked whether they would allocate money to an aid program against hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa (x) or to environmental protection programs in or close to the probants' home country. In Situation 3, the issue at stake is whether a poor country should allocate its limited reserves of foreign currency to the purchase of dialysis machines (x) or to the purchase of fruit and vitamin pills (y) to selected parts of the population. In Situation 4, the issue is whether a poor country should allocate foreign currency to the purchase of dialysis machines (x) or to the import of Bordeaux wine (y). In Situation 5, the question is whether a poor country should allocate foreign currency to the purchase of clothing for a group of needy people (x) or to the import of Bordeaux wine (y). Finally, in Situation 6 the issue is whether a run-down country should emphasize workers' rights to strike and to choose occupation freely and pull itself up by its bootstraps (x) or accept a condition to set aside workers' basic rights in order to obtain a favorable loan that would benefit some or all of the following groups: large firms, the self-employed with small or medium-sized firms, civil servants and retired persons.
The experimental design outlined above provides responses to a sequence of four choices, for all six situations. The responses can be used to examine two issues. First, will the sequence of choices follow a systematic pattern where the inclination to decide in accordance with Hammond's equity axiom changes in response to changes in the level of the treatment variable? Second, for each situation, does the probability of a specific choice at a given stage of the experiment depend on the previous choice, i.e. is there state dependence?
All situations are designed so that there will be unanimous support for the claim that alternative x is a social goal worth pursuing. In Situations 1, 2, 3 and 6, the same is likely to hold for alternative y. Situations 4 and 5, however, were deliberately designed so that some may consider alternative y not to be warranted as a social goal. This was done in order to test the logic and consistency of probants' answers across situations and to test for context dependence of choices. Since in the present paper we use a Norwegian data set, it is natural to interpret Situation 1 as referring to the probant's own country, with the money available for policies x and y being government revenues. Moreover, the handicapped person that would benefit from policy x could well be the probant herself, after let us say a car accident, and the intelligent child that could benefit from policy y could well be the still unborn child of the probant. Consequently, Situation 1 comes close to the context behind the Rawlsian concept of the veil of ignorance and Harsanyi's choice under uncertainty.
Situations 3, 4, 5 and 6 differ from 1 in the sense that they clearly relate to other countries than the one where the probants live. In these situations, it is clear that the probants neither will have to contribute to the funding of policies x and y, nor will they benefit from those policies. Consequently, in Situations 3, 4, 5 and 6, probants play the role of an outside judge. When it comes to Situation 2, it is less clear how closely related it is to probants, but it is reasonable to interpret it as lying somewhere between Situation 1 on the one hand and Situations 3, 4, 5 and 6 on the other hand.
In addition to questions about how given resources should be allocated, probants were asked about their demographic characteristics, parental professional background and expected position in a future income distribution. These variables are, in Section 8, used as explanatory variables in an econometric examination of what drives probants to make different distributional choices.
Data Collection
The data were collected in March 2001, using two different student groups at Agder University College located on the Southern coast of Norway. Group 1 consists of first-year students in a two-year study program in basic business administration (BBA). Group 2 consists of third-year students in an advanced two-year program in businesss administration (ABA). In order to be admitted to the ABA-program, it is required that students have passed the exams in the BBA-program, either at Agder University College, or at another Norwegian College. Only students with high grades from the BBA-program were admitted to the ABA-program.
Descriptions of the six situations together with answering sheets were administered during normal lecture hours. It was pointed out to the students that there was no such thing as a single right answer to a question. The first-year students had not been exposed to welfare theory or social choice theory prior to the experiment. The third-year students, by contrast, had been introduced to the concepts of utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare functions. Discussions with the students after the answering sheets had been collected revealed that at least some of the third-year students had figured out that the experiment was related to welfare economic issues and the concepts of Rawlsianism and Utilitarianism.
In total, the sample consists of 130 probants of which 66 were first-year students and 64 were third-year students. Information on demographic and other background variables was not provided by 20 probants. Therefore, when we relate decisions to demographic and background information in Section 8, we have to rely on the sample of 110 complete answers. Of the 110 respondents who provided complete information there was an equal split between males and females. Probants' age ranged from 19 to 40, but 95% of them were between 19 and 25 years old. About one-third had job experience. Probants identified themselves as having parents who were workers (7%), craftsmen (13%), skilled workers (4%), employed in public administration (25%), employed in the private sector (39%) or self-employed (12%). A comparison of these numbers with official statistics indicates that the sample is not too far from being representative when it comes to social background, although worker background is under-represented and self-employed background over-represented. When it comes to future expectations, however, probants did not consider themselves to be average individuals. This is seen from the fact that 40% expected to earn an income in the upper (fourth) quartile of the income distribution, 50 % expected to earn an income in the third quartile, but only 10 % expected to earn an income that would put them in the lowest two quartiles of the income distribution. For a more extensive presentation and analysis of the data see Jungeilges & Theisen (2005) .
Data analysis
For each situation, a sequence of four decisions, indexed by j ∈ {0, . . . , 3}, constitute the response of a probant. At each step in the sequence there is a binary choice: The decision can be in favor of the individual(s) who is (are) worst off under both policies, in which case it is in accordance with the equity axiom. Alternatively the decision can be in favor of those who are best off under both policies, which means that the decision follows a non-Rawlsian logic. The results of the experiment can be displayed by means of decision trees, one for each situation, as shown in Figures 1 to 6 . Each node in these trees represents a step in the sequence of four decisions -indicated by (0), (1), (2), (3) at the top of Figures 1 to 6. At each node, the upper branch represents a decision in accordance with the equity axiom, and the lower branch represents a decision that is not in accordance with the Rawlsian logic. 
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Let us use Figure 1 for explaining the sequential nature of the experiment in somewhat more detail. The upper branch of the tree (branch zero from the top) represents a sequence of decisions that follows the Rawlsian logic at each and every step of the sequence. The number 0.8692 on the first leg of this branch is the relative frequency of making a Rawlsian decision at the first step. Similarly, the number 0.7611 on the second leg of the branch is the relative frequency of a Rawlsian decision at the second step, conditional on a Rawlsian decision in the baseline question. In the same manner, the numbers 0.8023 and 0.9275 on the third and fourth leg of the upper branch are the relative frequencies of making Rawlsian decisions at steps number three and four, conditional on having made a Rawlsian decision at the previous step. The leaf frequency 0.4923 at the end of the branch is the frequency of deciding in accordance with the Rawlsian logic at all steps. Hence, the leaf frequency is the product of the frequencies on all the legs that make up the branch. Notice that the leaf frequencies of branch zero are large in all the six situations, indicating a strong tendency to decide in accordance with Hammond's axiom throughout the experiment.
Branch number 1 in Figure 1 represents a sequence where the probant in the baseline question (j = 0) decides in accordance with the equity axiom, sticks to the Rawlsian position at steps 1 and 2 as the group of individuals that would benefit from policy y is increased, but with a conditional frequency of 0.0725 deviates from the Rawlsian position at step 3. Similarly, branch 3 represents a sequence where the probant at steps 0 and 1 follows the Rawlsian logic, but with a frequency of 0.1977 leaves the Rawlsian position at step 2, and with a frequency of 0.9412 sticks to the non-Rawlsian position also at step 3. Furthermore, branch 7 represents a probant that takes a Rawlsian decision at step 0, but with a frequency of 0.2389 leaves the Rawlsian position at step 1, and sticks to the non-Rawlsian position with a frequency of 1.0000 at step 2 and with a frequency of 0.9359 at step 3.
Let us now summarize the main features of the choices in Situation 1. Starting at the root of the tree, observe first that there is a high frequency (0.8692) that the individual in the baseline question will chose in accordance with the equity axiom. Second, having initially made a Rawlsian decision, there is a high frequency of replicating that decision at later steps. The frequencies of deviating from the initial Rawlsian decision are, however, also sizable. Third, the frequency of initially making a non-Rawlsian decision is moderate, but having made such a decision at the first step there is a very strong tendency to stick to the same decision at the later steps.
In Situation 2, the frequency of individuals initially choosing in accordance with the equity axiom is high (0.7538), but slightly lower than in Situation 1. Having initially made a Rawlsian decision, there is a high frequency of sticking to such a decision also at later steps. The frequencies of deviating from the initial decision at steps 1, 2 or 3 are, however, not negligible. Third, the frequency of initially making a non-Rawlsian decision is moderate, but larger than in Situation 1. Having made a non-Rawlsian decision at the initial step, a sizable share of probants deviates from that decision at the next step, possibly because they consider the decision at the initial step as an error. Conditional on having made a non-Rawlsian decision at the first two steps there is, however, a very strong tendency to stick to the same decision at the later steps.
In Situation 3, the frequency that individuals initially choose in accordance with the equity axiom is high (0.8077). Moreover, if a decision in line with the equity axiom is made in the baseline question, we observe a high frequency of sticking to the same decision at later steps. The frequencies of deviating from the initial decision at later steps are, however, also sizable. Third, the frequency of initially making a non-Rawlsian decision is moderate, but given such a non-Rawlsian decision there is a very strong tendency to stick to the same decision at the later steps.
Situation 6 is considered next. Also here the frequency of individuals initially choosing in accordance with the equity axiom is high (0.7923). Having initially made a Rawlsian decision, there is a high frequency of sticking to the same decision at later steps, but the frequencies of deviating from the initial Rawlsian decision at later steps are far from negligible. Third, the frequency of initially making a non-Rawlsian decision is moderate (0.2077), but conditional on first having made a non-Rawlsian decision there is a very strong tendency to stick to the same decision at the later steps.
Finally, consider Situations 4 and 5. In both of these situations the frequency of initially choosing in accordance with the equity axiom is close to 1, and once having made a Rawlsian choice at the initial step, very few are deviating from this decision at later steps. Hence, in Situation 4, as well as in Situation 5, we find a high relative frequency of support for the worst-off individual(s), no matter how large the set of individuals who are better off under any alternative. This tendency is most pronounced in Situation 4, where the leaf frequency shows that 92% of the probants through all steps of the experiment favor the worst-off individuals, compared to 82% in Situation 5. In contrast, the fraction of probants that at all steps showed support for those who are worst-off in Situations 1, 2, 3 and 6 is substantially lower and fairly stable between 40% and 50%, cf. the leaf frequencies of the very upper branches. Only between 10% and 20% of the respondents do not allocate funds to the worst-off individuals at all, as shown by the leaf frequencies affiliated with the very lower branches in Figures 1, 2 , 3, and 6. Apart from Situation 1, this is the branch that carries the second highest relative frequency. In Situations 1 and 3, approximately 35% of the probants eventually reconsider their support of the worst-off individuals, as the group of those who are better off under the alternative policies grows. The corresponding magnitude for Situations 2 and 6 are 23% and 28%.
Notice that the leaf frequencies that a probant will follow branches 1, 3 or 7 in Figure 1 to 6 are much smaller than the leaf frequency of branch zero. Relatively small frequencies are also associated with the very lower branch (15), which represents a sequence of non-Rawlsian decisions. Finally, observe the very small leaf frequencies of branches 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 . This large collection of branches contains two subsets. The first category consists of the eight branches 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 13, where the individual switches back and forth between deciding in accordance with the equity axiom and not adhering to the axiom. Such decision patterns are difficult to rationalize, and may indicate that the individual has not understood the logic of the experiment. In the second category, consisting of the three branches 8, 12 and 14, the individual at an early step does not decide in accordance with the equity axiom, but at a later step does adhere to that axiom. Such decision patterns seem peculiar. Throughout the rest of the paper we will refer to the decisions corresponding to all the branches 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 as inconsistent.
The fact that all the branches corresponding to sequences that are classified as inconsistent carry very small leaf frequencies indicates that probants largely must have understood the logic of the experiment. Moreover, one may speculate that the low frequency of inconsistent decisions simply may be due to errors in decision making. The fact that a large share of (seemingly) inconsistent decisions occurs at step 2, in particular in Situation 2, may be interpreted as a support of a random error hypothesis.
When it comes to to fulfillment of the equity axiom, the branches representing inconsistent decisions are not of primary interest. On the other hand, when testing for state dependence, we shall see that the some inconsistent branches carry decisive information.
If an inconsistent decision is made at an early stage and the individual continues to stick to that decision, it is indicative of state dependence. On the other hand, if an inconsistent decision is made at an early stage and the individual does not stick to that decision at later stages, it represents evidence against state dependence. We return in Section 6 more precisely to how this can be exploited.
The descriptive analysis of the data so far shows that decision behavior differs in intricate ways between contexts. In the sequel of this section, we will compare the situations under two different perspectives. First of all, we focus on the change in the probability of a decision adhering to the equity axiom as the group of individuals who are better off under both alternatives is extended. Second, the distribution of three types of decisions will be scrutinized: decisions that are consistent and in line with the equity axiom, those which are consistent but do not following the axiom, and finally inconsistent decisions. In each case, we aggregate information contained in the decision trees to reduce the complexity of the evidence. We seek a clearer view concerning the variation of judgements in the different contexts. Apart from that, both views are in some way related to state dependence. The graphs associated with the first perspective can be thought of as an informal way to assess the degree of state dependence. The second perspective produces an overview of the results for all situations. In addition it provides prior information concerning the existence of the state dependence estimator derived in Section 6.
The evidence on changes in the probability of adherence to the equity axiom is summarized in Figure 7 . Each subfigure is associated with a specific decision context. For obvious reasons, we only consider Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6. It contains a plot of the relative frequency of a decision fulfilling the equity axiom against the level of our treatment variable, i.e. the size of the group of those who are better off under both alternatives. For the baseline question (j = 0) the (unconditional) relative frequency can be read off the first leg of branch 0 of the decision tree. The frequency at step j ∈ {1, 2, 3} is computed as the product of the first j + 1 (conditional) frequencies found on branch 0 of the decision tree for the respective situation. Each observed frequency is indicated by a •. In addition, we superimpose a plot of hypothetical probabilities of choosing in accordance with the axiom on step 1, 2, and 3 of the experiment. The hypothetical probabilities are based on the assumption that a probant, once (s)he decided in line with the axiom at step 0, lets a random process (independent identically distributed Bernoulli trials B(p = 0.5)) determine her or his subsequent choices. Each hypothetical probability is indicated by •. Finally, we add a horizontal line extending to the right of the baseline frequency of choosing according to Rawlsian logic.
The graph of the relative frequencies shows the effect that a variation in the treatment variable has on the judgements of probants. The hypothetical probabilities indicate how the evidence should look like if probants did not take the information on the group size into consideration (or they considered it but it did not influence their choice at all) and there was no state dependence. The horizontal line also relates to a hypothetical scenario: If probants who adhere to the equity axiom in the baseline decision continue to do so on each and every later step, despite the information on the group size, then the observed frequencies for steps 1 to 3 would lie on this line. The line reflects the hypothetical case of perfect state dependence but at this stage of the analysis we cannot determine whether this state dependence is pure or spurious.
Situation 1 is unique in the sense that probants are confronted with a simple quantitative expansion of the group that could benefit if resources are not allocated to the worst-off individual. As indicated by Figure 7 , the fraction of the respondents adhering to the equity axiom is a decreasing function of the number of highly gifted individuals. While in the baseline situation 87% of the respondents support the disabled individual, the relative frequency of this outcome drops to 66% as two gifted children can be educated. The product of the conditional frequencies of 0.7611 and 0.8692 taken from Figure 1 (conditional frequencies on the first two subbranches of branch 0) equals 0.6615. A stepwise extension of the group of gifted children leads to a further erosion of the support for the disabled child. Eventually slightly less than 50% of the respondents decide in line with the equity axiom.
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If the relative frequency of the event that is a probant's decision is consistent with the axiom given the probant adhered to the axiom before, is small, then the absolute value of the slope will be large and vice versa.
In contrast to the reference situation, in Situation 2 the expansion is measured on an ordinal scale. As in Situation 1, the share of probants who maintain the Rawlsian position decreases as the number of those benefiting from environmental measures increases. The nature of the decline is, however, different from the one observed in Situation 1. The relatively flat graph indicates that there is less support for those who are worse off under any alternative in the baseline question than in Situation 1 and the first two conditional frequencies for fulfilling the axiom are larger than in Situation 1. It will be interesting to see whether these differences do trigger significant differences between the density functions for Situations 1 and 2.
The pattern of the graph for Situation 3 is similar to that of Situation 1. Again, the support for those who are worse off (dialysis patients) tapers off. As in Situation 1, probants who have decided in line with the axiom in the baseline situation and at step 1 and 2 are highly likely to decide in favor of the dialysis patients also at step 3 as indicated by the pronounced flat part of the graph.
In Situation 6, the fraction of probants not willing to give up basic rights of workers in favor of higher growth decreases as more groups benefit from higher growth. Again, the nature of the decline differs from what was observed in Situations 1 and 3. Note the steep decline as the category civil servants is introduced on stage (2) of the experiment in Situation 6. The conditional frequency of choosing in line with the axiom drops to 76% (cf. Figure 6 ) at that stage.
To summarize, the sequence of graphs reveals similarities as well as differences in the decision behavior of probants in the four situations or contexts. While the propensity to decide in line with the axiom declines in all situations as the size of the group of those benefitting under alternative y is increased, there are subtle differences in the nature of the decline. It is common to all four situations that the graph of observed frequencies does not coincide with the graph for the hypothetical probabilities. We conclude that probant's behavior is driven by systematic factors. At this stage of the analysis it is unclear whether state dependence and/or individual specific effects can explain our observations.
Next, let us consider the distribution of three types of decisions previously introduced: consistent decisions in line with the equity axiom, consistent decisions not following the axiom, and inconsistent decisions. Figure 8 gives this distribution for all situations. 
The estimated probability of deciding in accordance with the equity axiom is measured on the horizontal axis in Figure 8 . The probability of either initially or eventually deciding in a non-Rawlsian way is measured on the vertical axis. Finally, the estimated probability of not deciding according to any of these patterns is measured by the vertical or horizontal distance from the point representing a situation to the hypotenuse of the equilateral triangle. This distance reflects the probability for the occurrence of what we have characterized as inconsistent decisions. Notice that our probants were most likely to decide inconsistently in Situation 2. Although to a smaller degree, we also observed inconsistent decisions in Situation 3. In the other situations very few decisions were inconsistent. As already mentioned, the special importance of these decisions will become apparent when we test for state dependence in Section 7.
Two distinct clusters of decision patterns are apparent in Figure 8 . Cluster A consists of Situations 1, 2, 3 and 6, while Situations 4 and 5 constitute cluster B. As pointed out in Section 3, the situations in cluster B were introduced mainly to check for the logic and consistency of probants' answers. The situations in both clusters may, however, be useful when we in Section 7 test for state dependence. In our examination of whether the individuals in the sample behave in accordance with Rawlsian logic, we are primarily interested in the situations in cluster A which appear to have similar decision patterns, both on the high aggregation level of Figure 8 , and on the lower level of aggregation used in Figures 1 to 6 . Nevertheless, we carry out a formal test for differences in decision patterns in cluster A. This is the issue to which we now turn.
In Figures 1 to 6 , we have observed that some branches carry high leaf frequencies, while other branches carry low leaf frequencies. Since each branch can be interpreted as representing one of the sixteen elementary events (sequences) in our experiment, the structure of the leaf frequencies indicates a multi (local) modal nature of the distributions of elementary events. In particular this seems to be the case for Situations 1, 2, 3 and 6. This suggests that testing a hypothesis involving location parameters of densities only is inadequate. A more comprehensive analysis revealing subtle differences in the characteristics of the distributions is called for. Hence, we test the hypothesis of pairwise equality of multinomial distributions using a Pearson-type χ 2 test. Details concerning the justification of this choice and a description of the test itself can be found in Jungeilges & Theisen (2003) .
Let p ij denote the probability of realizing outcome (branch) i with i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . 15} in situation s with s ∈ S := {1, 2, 3, 6}. For each of the 6 pairs in the set {(s, s ) | s, s ∈ S ∧ s < s }, we then test the hypotheses
The results for the six χ 2 tests are shown in Table 2 . Convincing evidence against the null hypothesis of identical densities is found only for the pairs (1, 2) and (1, 6). By decomposing the χ 2 -test statistic into the contributions by each single event, we can identify the importance of events for the rejection of the null hypothesis. Again, for more details on this disaggregation the reader is referred to Jungeilges & Theisen (2003) .
For the case of Situation 1 versus Situation 2, our decomposition of the test statistic indicates that event "7", corresponding to the branches with leaf frequency 0.1923 in Figure  1 and 0.0538 in Figure 2 accounts for approximately 20% of the value assumed by the test statistic leading to the rejection of H 0 . This rejection does not come as a surprise considering the distance between the points 1 and 2 in Figure 8 . From the proximity of the points 1 and 6 in Figure 8 it is however surprising that H 0 is clearly rejected in the test involving Situations 1 and 6. The explanation again lies in the difference between the leaf frequencies for branch number 8 from above in Figures 1 and 6 . This branch accounts for nearly 60% of the χ We have in this section seen that the majority of the respondents reveal themselves as either Rawlsians (40%-50%) or non-Rawlsians (10%-20%). The majority of the remaining probants eventually respond to modifications of the situations by leaving the Rawlsian position. This feature holds across all Situations 1, 2, 3 and 6. In addition, four out of six formal tests fail to produce significant evidence against the null hypothesis of identical distributional preferences. Using Situation 1 as a reference, we find significant evidence against the null hypothesis for Situations 2 and 6. In both cases, the strong evidence can mainly be attributed to branches number 1, 3, and 7 which all reflect moves away from the Rawlsian position.
The descriptive analysis of this section indicates, first of all, differences in decision behavior between situations. The statistical significance of these differences has been established by the χ 2 tests just carried out. In addition, the analysis suggests the existence of some form of dependence between the sequential decisions in each situation. Our experiment generates data similar to panel data. For that data structure Heckman (1981) provides an extensive discussion of the different kinds of forces that may be at work. Two phenomena are particularly relevant in our context: Individual heterogeneity, and true state dependence. In the following section, we outline a model of sequential decisions that allows for state dependence as well as for individual effects. In Section 7, we discuss the role of state dependence and individual effects in the experiment, and we examine how well the estimated model can reproduce the trees in Figures 1 -6 , conditional on the decision made at the initial step.
The econometric model
In this section, we specify a dynamic binary response model in which state dependence and unobservable individual effects might operate to determine the probability for a success in period t, conditional on a success in the previous period. Inference concerning the state dependence parameter rests on the assumption that the data generating process is observed at exactly four points in time. In our case, many observations of such short histories are available. This model definitely reflects how data are generated in the experiments discussed in the previous sections.
Consider the following dynamic binary response model with the dependent variable lagged once
where i = 1, . . . , N indexes observations on individuals and t = 1, . . . , T serves as a time index. In our case T equals 3. We assume that the probability for a success occurring in the initial period depends on the unobservable individual-specific effect δ i ∈ IR alone, i.e.
The explicit maximum likelihood estimator for the state dependence parameter γ is derived below. As demonstrated by Chamberlain (1985) , inference concerning this parameter is independent of the individual specific effects δ i . We give conditions under which the estimator exist. After a discussion of the test statistic, we outline the likelihood ratio procedure (LR) to test H 0 : γ = 0 versus H 0 : γ = 0.
Result 1 Given a random sample of N binary strings
the inference about the state dependence parameter γ is based on the log-likelihood function
where n j ∈ IN + and 6 j=1 n j = N .
Proof: Following an approach due to Chamberlain (1985) which is outlined in Honoré & Kyriazidou (2000) , inference about γ can be based on the log-likelihood function
where χ denotes the indicator function. We will now work out the possible realizations of the term under the sum. Among the sequences for which y i1 + y i2 = 1 holds, we have cases in which y i1 = 0 and cases for which y i1 = 1. If y i1 = 0 then the term ln e
simplifies to
).
whereas it is equal to
) if y i1 = 1. Considering all possible combinations of y i0 and y i3 these terms again simplify. Table 3 contains all possible values (2) can assume. 
Summing over all products of case counters and likelihood terms in Table 3 yields the following representation of the likelihood function
Standard algebraic manipulations then leads to
Notice that the log-likelihood function is independent of individual-specific effects δ i . Consequently, the maximum likelihood estimator of γ can be determined. It will not depend on individual specific effects. The ML estimator is stated in the following result.
Result 2 If n 3 + n 5 > 0 and n 2 + n 6 > 0 then the maximum likelihood estimator of γ exists and it is equal toγ = ln n 2 + n 6 n 3 + n 5 .
Proof: The first order condition for the unconstrained optimization problem max γ∈IR L(γ) equals
= (n 2 + n 6 ) − (n 2 + n 3 + n 5 + n 6 ) 1
= (n 2 + n 6 ) − (n 2 + n 3 + n 5 + n 6 ) e
⇔ e γ 1 + e γ = n 2 + n 6 n 2 + n 3 + n 5 + n 6 ≡ ξ Solve for γ:
If n 3 + n 5 > 0 and n 2 + n 6 > 0 then ξ ∈ (0, 1) and the following estimator is defined
Considering the definition of ξ we get
The ML estimator is therefore given bŷ γ = ln n 2 + n 6 n 3 + n 5 .
Establish the second order condition:
Evaluating the second derivative atγ we obtain
n 2 +n 6 n 3 +n 5 n 2 +n 3 +n 5 +n 6 n 3 +n 5 2 = −β n 2 +n 6 n 3 +n 5 β n 3 +n 5 2 (7)
Note that strong inequality only holds if
The maximum likelihood estimator (3) of γ is obtained by applying the natural logarithm to a ratio of counts. The numerator of this ratio is the count of cases in which just one state change occurs. The denominator is the number of occasions in which one observes three state changes. Consequently, the value of the estimator is positive (negative) if the number of sample outcomes in which one state change occurs is larger (smaller) than the number of incidences with three state changes. Large positive values ofγ reflect strong state dependence in the sense that the probability of realizing a success in period t is high if a success has been observed in period t − 1. If, on the other hand, the estimator assumes a value close to minus infinity there is a high probability for observing a failure in t given a success occurred in the previous period. If the absolute frequencies of cases with only one state change and cases with three changes are approximately the same, the estimator will take a value close to zero. This would be the case if the underlying process consisted of independent draws from a Bernoulli density B(p = 0.5). In the context of model (1) the probability for a success after a success had been observed before would then just be determined by the individual specific effect δ i . The maximum likelihood estimator is based on counts of elementary events which are in some sense extreme. Each elementary outcome can be characterized in terms of the number of state changes (from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0 ) it involves. A total enumeration of the possible state changes in the present case (τ = 4) is given in column three of Table 4 . As outlined above, an implementation of Chamberlain's approach aiming at an estimator of the state dependence parameter which is independent of the individual effects δ i requires us to focus on a subset of the elementary outcomes only, i.e. on the sets A = A 1 ∪ A 2 and B = B 1 ∪ B 2 . An inspection of Table 4 suggests that the minimal number of state changes indicated by the events constituting the set A ∪ B is one. The two extreme cases in which no state change occurs, i.e. (0 0 0 0) and (1 1 1 1) lie in the complement of A ∪ B. To obtain an estimator of γ which is independent of individual effects we are forced to ignore those elementary outcomes of the experiment that are highly indicative of the existence of state dependence. In the manner of a second best solution the estimator is therefore based on a count of events in which the state changes exactly one time: (0011) ∈ A and (1100) ∈ B. In the present context, the strongest manifestation of lack of state dependence are outcomes involving three state changes. As it can be seen from Table 4 , the two outcomes exhibiting the maximum number of changes will satisfy the constraints implied by Chamberlain's approach are: (0101) ∈ A and (1010) ∈ B.
The conditions under which the estimator is guaranteed to exist are stated in Result 2. If a sample does not contain admissible cases with exactly one state change (n 2 + n 6 = 0) or one does not observe any binary sequences indicating three state changes (n 3 + n 5 = 0) then the maximum likelihood estimator of γ is not defined. From a formal point of view it does not exist. If n 2 + n 6 = 0 the strongest possible evidence against state dependence is just not observed, while in the case of n 3 + n 5 = 0 one does not find the strongest type of admissible evidence for state dependence in the sample. If for a given data set it is found that the estimator does not exist then the analyst should always be informed about the cause of the non-existence. If one of the two conditions is violated alone then it is possible to interpret this event as evidence in favor of state dependence (n 3 + n 5 = 0) or against the hypothesis of state dependence (n 2 + n 6 = 0). In the application described in the following section, there are examples of such occasions.
Inference
Given the responses of N = 130 students, we estimated the state dependence parameter γ as well as the likelihood ratio statistic for each situation. The results are summarized in Table 5 . Given the sample at hand, we obtain a maximum likelihood estimate of γ in Situations 2 and 3. In both cases, the hypothesis H 0 : γ = 0 is clearly rejected at the 5% level on the basis of the likelihood ratio statistic. In all the remaining situations none of the respondents altered her or his decision from being in line with the equity axiom to not adhering to the axiom (or vice versa) every time the group of individuals better off anyway is enlarged (c.f. Table 5 where n 3 + n 5 ). Therefore, the type of condition triggering the non-existence of the estimatorγ actually constitutes evidence for the hypothesis that the process generating the sequence of decisions exhibits state dependence. In Situations 2 and 3, we find sufficient probability mass over the events (0 1 0 1) and (1 0 1 0) to identify a numerical value of the estimator. In the light of the evidence shown in Figure 8 , which allows us to distinguish between situations in which the responses include a sufficient fraction of noisy (inconsistent) observations and situations for which such observations are rare, the content of Table 5 could be expected. As discussed above, to obtain a numerical measure of state dependence which is independent of the individual specific effects, the noise (inconsistent answers) -responses which do not seem to follow the logic of the equity principle or any other principle of distributive justice -is (are) essential.
For each situation in which we obtained values forγ, we construct a hypothetical decision tree based on the assumption that no individual effects are operating (δ i = 0). According to (1), the probability for arriving at a choice in line with the equity axiom at step t, given the probant had chosen in the Rawlsian spirit at step t − 1, can be stated aŝ
. , y i t−1 ) = eγ
where we take the relative frequency for the initial choice as it is observed in the experiment. The individual specific effect cannot be removed from the probability estimate of the initial choice. The conditional probabilities computed from (9) are put on the branches of the decision tree. Apart from the dependence on the initial choice, the resulting tree depends on the state dependence estimator only. Hence, we call it aγ-tree. This tree provides (i) an estimate for the distribution of the logically possible outcomes of the experiment (leaf probabilities) and (ii) it gives an insight into the process by which this distribution is generated, i.e. via the probabilities on the branches for the hypothetical case that there were no individual specific effects operating once the initial decision has been made. Theγ-trees are shown in Figures 9 and 11.
Let us contrast the distribution obtained under the hypothesis of no individual specific effects with the estimate of the distribution based on the entire sample evidence. For this purpose we compute the differences between the conditional (branch) frequencies based on all observations (shown on the branches of the decision trees in Figures 2 and 3 ) and the probabilities found in the correspondingγ-trees, i.e.
The tree constructed by positioning the differences between the conditional probabilities on the associated branches while attaching the differences in leaf probabilities to the leafs is referred to as a ∆-tree. For Situations 2 and 3 the ∆-trees are shown in Figures 10 and 12. Finding a positive (negative) value in the ∆-tree suggests that the probability is underestimated (overestimated) by a model which ignores individual specific effects. In turn, the larger the absolute values of the observed differences, the stronger the role of individual specific effects for the decision under scrutiny.
Figure 9:γ-tree for Situation 2 (KS data)
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Figure 10: ∆-tree for Situation 2 (KS data)
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Consider now theγ-and ∆-trees for Situation 2 are given in Figures 9 and 10 If individual specific effects play no role role, we would observe an outcome in which an individual always chooses in line with the equity axiom in about 42% of all cases. Close to 14% of the probants would decide against supporting Sub-Sahara Africa, no matter how many individuals would benefit from the environmental program.
From the leaf differences in the ∆-tree for Situation 2 we conclude that ignoring individual effects would lead us to overestimate the probability for the occurrence of ten out of the sixteen possible outcomes. The degree of overestimation would be small though. The strongest deviation is equal to -0.0364 for the case in which individuals decide to always support the environmental program once the program includes the reduction of air pollution caused by coal-fired power plants (0 1 1 1) . Among the four incidences of underestimation the most pronounced one occurs in connection with the event (0 0 0 0), i.e. a probant always chooses according to the equity axiom. The observed frequency for that events amounts to 0.4923 (c.f. Figure 2) while a model incorporating state dependence only assigns a lower probability of 0.4210 to this event. The difference of 0.0713 is accounted for by the working of unobservable individual effects. Note that an approach relying on our state dependence estimate alone will produce a fairly accurate prediction of the event that a probant under no circumstances will support Sub Sahara Africa. Once an individual has arrived at such a decision in the initial situation she will most likely not reconsider that choice. Furthermore, we observe that a model based on state dependence alone will tend to overestimate the probability for events which were classified as inconsistent. Individual factors seem to operate in the direction of keeping probants away from responding to the experiment by choice sequences that are hard to explain by a Rawlsian or a utilitarian logic.
Another distinct feature of the ∆-tree for Situation 2: the differences observed for the lower part of the tree on the first and second stage of the experiment are distinctly larger than the differences for the same stages in the upper part of the tree. For example, the model taking into account only state dependence predicts that probants who support the environmental program initially will do so at the next stage of experiment in 82.35% of all cases. Figure 2 reveals that the relative frequency for such an event equals 0.7188. The ∆-tree gives the difference of -0.1048, providing evidence that there are individual effects at work.
In the ∆-tree for Situation 3 we find large entries (in absolute values) in the upper part of the tree. For individuals who have decided against the dialysis patients at the initial step, the model relying on state dependence only predicts choices in subsequent decisions fairly well. Those probants are not likely to revise their initial choice. The state dependence parameter for Situation 3 is significantly higher than the one for Situation 2. Aγ value of 3.04 suggests that a decision which was made on the previous stage of the experiment will be replicated at the current state with a probability of 95%. This prediction is not describing what we observe for probants who have chosen to support the dialysis patients at the outset. The tendency to reconsider the initial choice on stage 1 and 2 (in the light of the expansion of the group of those who are better off under any circumstances) is grossly underestimated by a model ignoring individual effects (c.f. 0.1831 stage 1 and 0.2014 stage 2). As a result we overestimate the occurrence of the event in which a probant always decides in line with the equity axiom, i.e. always supports the dialysis patients.
Figure 11:γ-tree for Situation 3 (KS data)
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Figure 12: ∆-tree for Situation 3 (KS data)
e e e e e e e e e e e e Focussing on the differences shown for the leafs of the ∆-tree we find a pronounced tendency to underestimate the prevalence of outcomes in which individuals reconsider their initial Rawlsian choice. Strong individual effects seem to be operating here, working in the direction of revision of initial choices. Moreover, the state dependence model predicts a weak tendency to choose so called inconsistent outcomes. The small differences on the leaves indicate that probant behavior in that respect is modelled fairly well by just taking the laws of chance and state dependence into consideration.
Comparing the ∆-trees for the two situations we conjecture that the role and the nature of the individual effects in the two situations differ drastically. It will be the goal of future research effort to substantiate that conjecture.
8 Modelling the initial propensity to fulfill the equity axiom
In the previous section we focused on the role of state dependence conditional on the choice made by the individual in the baseline question. We now turn to the choice at the initial stage of the experiment. Specifically, we examine whether this choice is in accordance with the Rawlsian logic. Jungeilges & Theisen (2005) demonstrate that an individual's propensity to act in accordance with the equity axiom in the baseline question can be modelled by means of a binary response model. Specifically, they assume a logit model, including a set of six covariates.
Due to the fact that there is no theory available to guide the specification of the logit model, we use an all-possible-model selection strategy. Apart from providing a parsimonious statistical model for the probability of the event that a probant decides in line with the equity axiom, this also has the potential to give clues towards factors that might play a crucial role in theoretical explanations. Given a set of six covariates one can, for each situation, specify and estimate 2 6 − 1 = 63 different models, with the intercept being forced into each model. After estimating all l-variable models for a given situation, they were ranked according to the likelihood-ratio index
where θ l refers to a model containing l covariates and θ 0 denotes the model containing the constant term only. The realizations of the criterion are restricted to the unit interval, with LRI = 0 indicating the case when all slope coefficients are equal to zero. For details on the nature and the merits of this criterion, see Menard (2000) . By determining for each group of l-variate models the one θ * l which -in a likelihood sense -constitutes the strongest improvement over the model including the intercept only we generate the increasing sequence
On the basis of this sequence, we choose as the final model θ * * the one with the smallest dimension fulfilling the requirement
with > 0 and small. Applying this strategy, the set of all covariates is partitioned into a set containing potentially useful explanatory variables and its complement constituted by those variables which were not found to contribute significantly to the model. We include six covariates (age (AGE), gender (SEX), parental background (PAR), job experience (JOEX), a variable measuring probants' expected place in a future income distribution (PPLI), and a dummy variable distinguishing between students at the first and third year of higher education (GROUP)). For more precise definitions of these covariates and a more comprehensive discussion of the rationale for including each of them see Jungeilges & Theisen (2005) .
We report only estimation results for the logit models of Situations 2 and 3, in which we obtained estimates of the state dependence the parameter. Results for Situations 1 and 6 can be found in Jungeilges & Theisen (2005) . The ML estimatesθ * * augmented by the associated standard errors, t-ratios and slope coefficients are reported in Tables 6 and 7. For Situation 2, the smallest model which could not be improved significantly by the inclusion of additional variables contains the three variables SEX, PAR and PPLI. The variable PAR should be interpreted as a measure of probants' self-perceived socioeconomic status. This variable is meant to capture the possibility that values are passed on from the older to the younger generation. It may also capture the effect of solidarity within the family. We expect that a probant coming from a family of workers will share the values of workers and be more likely to adhere to the Rawlsian equity principle than one coming from another social background. The results indicate that gender and parental background are crucial factors influencing the likelihood of a decision in favor of the equity axiom in the baseline question. Both SEX and PAR are associated with highly significant partial effects. The probability that a male probant will decide to allocate funds to the worst off (Sub-Sahara Africa) is considerably lower than for a female respondent. Similarly, those who characterize their parental background as being self-employment also show less propensity to choose in line with the equity axiom. The model including PAR alone is found to be the best single-variate explanation of the data (highly significant). Moreover, SEX and PAR alone constitute the best two-variable model. It should be emphasized that effects attributed to SEX and PAR do also hold if one does not control for the position an individual expects to hold in a future income distribution. But adding the PPLI variable has a profound effect on the likelihood of the sample. PPLI was, therefore, included in the final model. The gender variable which had a considerable partial effect on the probability for a decision in accordance with the equity axiom in Situation 2 does not appear in the final model for Situation 3. Here we find a strong negative partial education effect. Controlling for the duration of education through the GROUP variable, one also finds that respondents with job experience are less inclined to decide in favor of the worst off, the kidney patients.
From the results reported in Tables 6 and 7 it is evident that there is no common set of covariates providing a satisfactory empirical explanation of the adherence to the equity axiom across both situations. This finding leads us to conjecture that mental processes leading to a decision in line with the equity axiom differ from context to context. Nevertheless, the covariates with statistically significant impact parameters (SEX and PAR in Situation 2, GROUP and JOEX in Situation 3) have one important feature in common: They can all be interpreted as measures reflecting a probant's "history" up to the point in time when the experiment was carried out. In other words, a probant's pre-experiment history seems to have an important impact on the first choice made within the experiment. This finding is also very much in line with the finding in Section 7 that a probant's choice in the initial stages of the experiment has a profound impact on choices made at later stages.
It is also interesting that we in the estimation of logit models found no significant impact on equity judgements in the baseline question of our only forward-looking variable -expected position in a future income distribution (PPLI). This may be interpreted as being supportive of the view that the probants in our experiment in fact made their equity judgements in a situation close to a decision behind the veil of ignorance. This result stands in sharp contrast to the argument of Gaertner, Jungeilges & Neck (2001) that individuals in experiments do not put themselves under a 'veil of ignorance,' but consciously take into account their personal interests when making judgements.
In future research, one should include additional forward-looking variables that can be used in more extensive tests of this conclusion.
Conclusion
When presented with decision contexts that come close to real-world situations (Situations 1, 2, 3, and 6), we found that between 75% and 90% of the probants initially decided in accordance with the equity axiom. As the group of those who are better off is increased, however, between 25% and 35% leave the Rawlsian position. On the other hand, between 10% and 20% of the respondents never decide to the benefit of the worst-off individuals. Hence we can conclude that although there initially is a strong tendency to decide in accordance with Hammond's equity axiom, this tendency tapers off as the group of those who are better-off increases, and a small group will never follow the Rawlsian logic. This sequential nature of choices is clearly shown in Figures 1 to 6 .
The large majority of probants decide consistently throughout the experiment. Notice also that when presented with peculiar decision contexts (Situations 4 and 5), decisions differ markedly from what we found in realistic situations. These results strongly indicate that probants understood the logic of the experiment. Furthermore, the striking difference between the decision behavior in the real-world situations (1, 2, 3, and 6), and the more peculiar situations (4 and 5), indicate that decision behavior is context dependent. Evidence of context dependence is also provided by some of the tests carried out in Section 5 and from the fact that the set of covariates in the binary response models differs across situations. Our finding that equity judgements are context dependent is also in accordance with the conclusion of Gaertner, Jungeilges & Neck (2001) .
The fact that a large share of the probants stick to their initial decisions throughout the experiment may be due to state dependence, but may also be due to individual specific effects. To test for the presence of state dependence we estimated the state dependence parameter in a dynamic binary response model. The estimation results showed convincing evidence for state dependence in two of six situations. In the remaining four situations, the maximum likelihood estimator did not exist. This formal non-existence of the estimator does not rule out state dependence. In fact, analyzing the reason for the non-existence, we were able to conclude that state dependence was pronounced also in the situations for which the estimator did not exist.
For Situations 2 and 3 we were able to contrast hypothetical decision trees based on the estimated state dependence alone, with the observed decision trees. By means of these trees we could demonstrate to what degree individual specific effects influence the sequence of decision probants are taking in two out of the six situations. We concluded that those effects operate. State dependence alone cannot explain our observations. The role as well as the nature of the individual specific effects seem to differ across the two decision contexts.
Through estimation of logit models we found that variables reflecting a probant's "history" up to the point in time when the experiment was carried out had an impact on the probability of a decision in accordance with the Rawlsian equity axiom in the baseline question. The variables that had an impact differed, however, from situation to situation.
The fact that variables capturing the history of probants seem to have a strong bearing on social choices opens an interesting perspective. It implies that the equity judgements of the ruling majority in a society can be expected to evolve over time and that equity judgements in societies with different histories can be expected to differ. As indicated earlier, researchers have carried out the experiment reported in the present paper under more or less identical conditions in several countries (Germany, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia). The application of our approaches to testing and econometric modelling, and a careful comparison of the results for each country (culture) has the potential to shed more light on the factors determining distributive judgements.
Notice also that we found no significant impact on equity judgements of our only forwardlooking variable -expected position in a future income distribution (PPLI). This may be interpreted as being supportive of the view that the probants in our experiment in fact made their equity judgements in a situation that came close to a decision behind the veil of ignorance. In future research, one should include additional forward-looking variables that can be used in more extensive tests of this conclusion.
In our view, the results obtained in this paper clearly suggest that econometric modelling of probants' decisions in experiments seems to be a fruitful path of research even with the relatively simple models we have used. It might, however, be possible to extract even more information from the data through the use of alternative models. For instance, by considering the six different situations in our experiments as "cross-sections" in a panel data framework, it would be possible to take into account possible dependencies between probants' decisions in our six situations. It would also be possible to construct ordered dependent variables measuring the "degree of adherence to the equity axiom" and estimate ordered logit models. Since this would provide us with a more informative dependent variable, it might give even stronger results, but such modelling strategies would also require stronger assumptions. Alternatively, non-parametric econometric approaches building on weaker assumptions than the binary choice models, should be considered, to check for the robustness of our results. intelligent than person 2. Person 3 would, therefore, benefit even a bit more from the education than person 2. Let y be the investment into the education of the two children and let x again stand for the support of the handicapped person.
Would you choose x or y under these conditions? (b) Imagine that if the money were used to finance alternative y it would be possible to educate still another child (person 4). The reason may simply be "economies of scale" or the fact that a talented teacher will be able to provide a good education for several children simultaneously. Let us assume that all the other characteristics of the situation remain as before.
Which alternative should be picked in your view, x or y?
(c) Add another child to the situation (person 5), who could also receive an instruction in languages and the natural sciences out of the given budget. Everything else remains the same.
Would you want x or y to be realized? 
Situation 2:
(o) Imagine that due to an unexpectedly large profit of the Federal Reserve (or an unexpectedly large budgetary surplus, if you prefer), Government has the possibility to spend several billion marks (DM) either on environmental protection within its own territory (alternative y) or to spend that amount of money to finance an aid program against hunger in various countries of Subsaharan Africa (alternative x). Given the available amount of money, the environmental program would aim at improving the current situation of the North Sea. This would primarily benefit the fishing industry and, perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree, the people who spend their vacation along the North Sea. Henceforth, these two groups are called person 2. Those who suffer from famine in Subsaharan Africa are person 1. Undoubtedly, both the fishermen and the vacationers in this country are, in terms of welfare, better off than the starving people in Africa, independent of whether alternative x or alternative y will be realized. We want to assume that either only x or only y can be realized, not both.
Which alternative should be chosen according to your view, x or y?
(a) Imagine now that the profit of the Federal Reserve (or the budgetary surplus) has turned out to be higher than anticipated originally. On the one hand, the fight against hunger could now be intensified, on the other the environmental program could be extended. The proposal is to improve the quality of the air in the neighborhood of coal power plants. The group benefiting from this measure will be called person 3. We shall assume that this group will always be better off than groups 2 and 1 with respect to alternative y, and be definitely better off than group 1 with respect to alternative x. Alternative y again stands for environmental protection and x stands for relief of hunger (both programs would, of course, now be larger due to the higher level of financial resources).
Which alternative should be realized according to your view, x or y?
(b) Assume that it has become clear that "economies of scale" would occur in the environmental program, once alternative y should be realized. We postulate that a program for cleaner water in rivers should also be feasible which would benefit primarily those citizens of the country (group 4) who live close to the rivers (it seems obvious that cleaner water in rivers would, among other things, increase the stock of fish). In other words, not only would groups 2 and 3 benefit from the environmental program but also an additional group. Alternative y again stands for the environmental program and x stands for the aid program for Subsaharan Africa.
Which program should be chosen now, x or y?
(c) Imagine that, given the financial resources, a further enlargement of the environmental program appears realistic. It has, for example, been found out that an additional program aiming at a reduction of traffic noise along the highways would be financially feasible. Through this investment, still another group of people (group 5) would experience an increase in its living conditions. We assume that group 5 is better off than all the other groups under alternative y and that it is at least better off than group 1 under alternative x.
Which alternative should now be realized according to your view, x or y?
(d 1 ) If up to this point you have always made a decision in favor of alternative x, could you imagine a situation, in which you would choose y after all? And how should y look like in your view, or would you always take a decision in favor of the aid program against hunger? (d 2 ) On which criteria did you base your decision? Please give a brief explanation.
Situation 3:
(o) Imagine a country that has a severe shortage of western currencies. The governing body of this country has the possibility to purchase on the world market either a certain number of badly needed dialysis machines (alternative x) that cannot be produced within the country, or a certain quantity of vitamin pills as well as tropical fruit (alternative y). This quantity would only be enough to satisfy the urgent needs of a relatively small group of persons. The realization of both alternatives together or a combination of both alternatives to some extent is assumed to be infeasible. The group of people suffering from kidney problems is group 1, the group of people benefiting from the import of vitamins and fruits is group 2. There is unanimous agreement in the country that all pregnant women should make up group 2. It is also unanimously agreed that the persons with kidney trouble are clearly worse off than the expectant mothers.
Which alternative should be realized in your view, x or y?
(a) Imagine now that the world market price for vitamin pills and tropical fruit has fallen. If alternative y were realized it would be possible to provide not only the expectant mothers, but also all the country's babies and toddlers (group 3) with the needed vitamins. The price of dialysis machines is assumed to rest unchanged, however. The welfare levels of groups 2 and 3 are clearly higher than the level of group 1 both under y and under x.
Would you choose alternative x or alternative y?
(b) Let us imagine that there is a further decline in the world market price for vitamin pills and tropical fruit so that it turns out that under the given amount of western currencies the country's adolescents (group 4) could also be provided with vitamins if alternative y were chosen.
Which alternative should be chosen, x or y?
(c) The world market price of vitamin pills and tropical fruit declines once more so that under alternative y the given amount of western currencies would now suffice to provide those workers of the country who are engaged in physical labor (group 5) with the needed vitamins. Clearly, these workers are better off, no matter whether they receive the vitamins or not, than the group of persons who suffer from kidney problems.
Which of the two alternatives, x or y, should now be chosen?
(d 1 ) If up to this point you have always made a decision in favour of alternative x, could you imagine a situation, in which you would choose y after all? And how should y look like in your view, or would you always take a decision in favor of x? (d 2 ) On which criteria did you base your decision? Please give a brief explanation.
Situation 4:
(o) Imagine a country which has a severe shortage of western currencies. The governing body of this country has the possibility to purchase on the world market either a certain number of badly needed dialysis machines (alternative x) that cannot be produced within the country, or a certain quantity of expensive wines from the Bordeaux region (alternative y) that are desired by certain segments of the society. The realization of both alternatives together or a combination of both alternatives to some extent is assumed to be infeasible. It is hypothesized that the wines from Bordeaux have such a high price that they could only be purchased by a small group of relatively well-off citizens (group 2). The group of people suffering from kidney problems is group 1. It goes without saying that due to their illness, the dialysis patients are worse off than the potential buyers of expensive French wines. Alternative x refers to the import of dialysis machines and y refers to the import of wines from Bordeaux.
Which of the two alternatives should be chosen according to your view, x or y?
(a) Imagine that the price of Bordeaux wines has fallen so that a second group within society (group 3) would be able to purchase these wines if alternative y were realized. Clearly, the quantity of imported wines could be increased due to the lower market price. The price of dialysis machines is supposed to remain constant.
Which alternative should be selected now, x or y?
(b) Let us assume that a further decrease in price of the Bordeaux wines has occurred so that under the given amount of western currencies an even larger quantity of wines could be imported now. Therefore, due to the lower price per bottle, yet another group within society (group 4) could become a buyer of those wines.
Which alternative should now be realized, x or y?
(c) The price of wines from Bordeaux is supposed to fall once more so that, again, another group within society (group 5) would be put in a position to purchase these wines if alternative y were realized.
Would you choose x or y in this situation?
Situation 5:
(o) Once again, imagine a country with a severe shortage of western currencies. The governing body of this country has the possibility either to purchase on the world market a certain amount of inexpensive clothing (alternative x) which would allow the more needy segments of society (group 1) to significantly improve their welfare level, or to import a certain quantity of expensive wines from the Bordeaux region (alternative y) that a small group of rather well-to-do citizens of the country (group 2) would like to acquire. The realization of both alternatives together or a combination of both alternatives to some extent is assumed to be infeasible.
(a) Imagine that the price of Bordeaux wines has fallen so that a second group within society (group 3) would be able to purchase these wines if alternative y were realized. This additional group 3 is supposed to be better off in terms of welfare than group 1. We assume that the price of inexpensive clothing remains the same so that the quantity of imports would not change, should x be realized.
Should x or y be chosen?
(b) Let us assume that a further decrease in price of the Bordeaux wines has occurred so that with the given amount of western currencies an even larger quantity of wines could be imported now. Therefore, due to the lower price per bottle, yet another group within society (group 4) could become a buyer of these wines.
Which of the alternatives x or y should now be realized?
(d 1 ) If up to this point you have always made a decision in favour of alternative x, could you imagine a situation, in which you would choose y after all? And how should y look like in your view, or would you always take a decision in favour of x?
(d 2 ) On which criteria did you base your decision? Please give a brief explanation.
Situation 6:
(o) Imagine a country which had been totally run down economically by a long-lasting dictatorship. Finally, the country could get rid of this dictatorship. Furthermore, imagine that an international bank group is offering a rather large loan (under very favourable conditions of repayment) to this country for economic reconstruction (alternative y). However, the consortium declares that the prerequisite for this loan should be that the employees in the country be granted neither a right to strike nor the free choice of occupation. This precondition would remain valid for the foreseeable future. If the new Government were unwilling to enforce this curtailment of individual rights, no loan would be offered, and, therefore, the country would have to pull itself up by its bootstraps (alternative x). In that case, the country would, of course, have the option to reinstall the right to strike and other basic rights, a measure which had been promised to the citizens of the country after the fall of the dictatorship. If the bank loan were granted, the large enterprises (group 2) would be the first to experience an economic recovery. The workers and employees in the firms (group 1) would be hard hit by the restriction of basic rights. Also, their economic situation would be worse than that of the people in charge of the large enterprises.
What should the country do in your view, should it decide in favour of y or x?
(a) Imagine that the initial situation were to undergo the following modification: The loan which is offered would have such a large volume that an additional group of the population, the self-employed persons with a small or middle-sized business activity, let's say, would benefit from the financial aid (group 3). Let this alternative again be denoted by y. Alternative x remains as before.
Should the country choose x or y?
(b) Imagine again a change of the initial situation: The bank loan offered is so large that under alternative y still another group of the population, the civil servants, let's say, would realize larger economic benefits (group 4). Alternative x remains unchanged.
Which alternative should now be picked by the country?
(c) A further variation: we shall assume that still another group within the population, the retired members of society (group 5), would experience an improvement of their economic situation under alternative y. Alternative x remains unchanged.
Which alternative should now be chosen according to your view, x or y? Demographic Characteristics:
(1) sex: (1 = female, 2 = male) (2) age:
(3) Which of the following categories describes best the professional status of the family in which you grew up?
(1 = unskilled worker, 2 = skilled worker, 3 = craftsman, 4 = employee or civil servant in the public sector, 5 = employee in the private sector, 6 = self-employed) (4) subject of study: (1 = business administration, 2 = mathematics, 3 = economics, 4 = other) (5) Were you employed before starting with your studies?
(1 = yes, 2 = no) (6) How many percent of the citizens of your country do you expect to have, in the year 2010, a net-income lower than your own?
(1 = 5%, 2 = 25%, 3 = 50%, 4 = 75%, 5 = 95%)
